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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
The size of the public sector and clientelism feature prominently in the public debate 
over the potential causes of Greece’s recent economic crisis. Weak institutions and 
reluctance to reform them provided a fertile environment for extended opportunistic 
policies and rent-seeking activities (Mitsopoulos Pelagidis, 2007; Pelagidis and 
Mitsopoulos, 2012). The emergence of electoral cycles in fiscal policies is one 
manifestation of such opportunistic behavior (Lockwood et al., 2001). Political budget 
cycles, however, may not be confined to central government politics and part of the 
literature attempts to identify opportunistic patterns at the local government level as 
well. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2007) provide evidence of political cycles in 
Portuguese municipalities, while Chortareas et. al. (2013) consider Greece's municipal 
budgetary decisions. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that budgetary cycles 
at the national level in developed countries are not as pronounced as in developing 
countries due to institutional constraints (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Klomp and De 
Haan, 2013). This paper considers the experience of Greek municipalities’ hiring 
decisions shifting focus from budgetary to employment decisions. Pre-electoral 
manipulation of public hiring at the municipal level may be tempting for the 
incumbents since it involves far fewer restrictions as compared to employment at the 
central government level. The decision-making process is decentralized and the 
selection process is subject to less rigid rules, rendering the hiring decisions less 
visible and elusive to public scrutiny. The evidence on employment cycles at the local 
government level is in general scant. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to 
analyze the experience of Greece's municipalities. Greece is an advanced economy, 
but has nevertheless experienced long periods of political polarization and frequent 
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episodes of political instability during the last few decades and a profound economic 
crisis in the recent years. 
The large number of public sector employees is broadly considered a key feature of 
the Greek economy that has contributed to the current crisis. The issue of contract 
workers in municipalities in particular has been a major area of debate in the run up to 
the 2004 general elections. The conservative party of "New Democracy" advocated 
the transformation of contract employees to permanent as long as they contributed to 
the core operations in each municipality. In the aftermath of the elections the working 
relationship of a large number of contract public sector employees, mainly in 
municipalities, changed to permanent, often after relevant court rulings. This move 
was latter perceived as characteristic of practices that led to Greece’s fiscal 
derailment. This issue resurfaced in February of 2015 with a new twist, when the 
conservative minister who had introduced the related highly controversial legislation1 
was the surprise (single) candidate for the position of the President of the Hellenic 
Republic, proposed by the new coalition government of the radical left (SYRIZA) and 
the populist right ("Independent Greeks").   
In this paper we construct a new dataset from primary sources, as the relevant data 
are not readily available. While the limited related literature typically focuses on the 
number of total employees,2 our dataset allows us to additionally consider the 
composition of employment in terms of the nature of the employment relationship. 
Specifically, whether the local government employees fall in the category of 
permanent, contract or day-labor employees. Our results reveal strong evidence of 
electoral cycles especially in those employment relationships that permit incumbents 
                                                          
1
 Presidential Decree 64/2004. 
2
 Coelcho et. al. (2006) consider employment across different activities (e.g. construction, 
transportation, social services, electricity) but not the permanent or temporary nature of employment 
contracts.   
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to build quasi-permanent ties with employees whose job depends upon perpetual 
contract renewals. The evidence we produce show that elections positively affect the 
total number of employees, a result that is mainly driven by increases in contract 
employees. These electoral effects appear robust when we consider a series of 
political controls regarding factors that might shape an incumbent’s incentive and 
ability to adopt or not opportunistic policies prior to elections. We specifically focus 
on the effects of electoral competition, the incumbents’ decision to run for another 
term, and the mayors’ political alignment with the central government. We also 
examine how general elections affect municipal hiring and find that their effect is 
similar to that of municipal elections, a finding indicative of the close ties between 
central and local level politics in Greece. Our results contribute to the literature on 
political employment cycles at the municipal level by studying the previously 
unexplored dimension of the composition of municipal public hiring in terms of the 
form of the employment relationships, by investigating the interaction between central 
and local government politics, and by explicitly focusing on the effect that political 
competition has on the magnitude of the electoral effects. Moreover, our findings on 
incumbents’ opportunistic behavior provide insights into Greece’s political economy 
in the run-up to the current economic crisis.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next section presents the related 
literature. Section 3 describes Greece’s local government institutions, our newly 
constructed dataset, and the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results of our 
analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 4 
 
2. Related Literature 
A number of empirical studies document the presence of opportunistically motivated 
politicians who manipulate economic policies to enhance their re-election prospects. 
Such electorally motivated cycles, mainly in government expenditures, have been 
identified by both single and multi-country studies. Recent evidence of electoral 
cycles in fiscal policies include Gonzalez (2002), Persson and Tabellini (2003), 
Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006), Potrafke (2012). Drazen (2001) 
and Haan and Klomp (2013) provide reviews of the literature. 
 A number of papers consider political cycles at the local level. Focusing on 
electoral cycles at the sub-national level allows for greater homogeneity in 
government structure and the institutional environment as well as in the available 
policy instruments (Veiga and Veiga (2007). It also allows for uniformity in electoral 
rules and dates (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011). Evidence of electoral cycles in 
local governments’ policies have been documented for a number of countries. Galli 
and Rossi (2002) consider German federal states and show that expenditures increase 
during election years while Blais and Nadeau (1992) examine spending on social 
services and infrastructure construction for ten of Canada’s provincial governments 
documenting similar electoral effects. Along the same lines Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya (2004) argue that opportunistic cycles can also be found in Russia’s 
regional governor elections as their findings identify increased public spending before 
elections. Veiga and Veiga (2007) explicitly focus on municipal finances, producing 
evidence of electoral effects in Portuguese municipalities where elections negatively 
affect the budget balance. Likewise, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) document the 
presence of opportunistically induced cycles in Brazil's local finances, with increased 
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total and current expenditure before elections. Foucault et al. (2008) find similar 
opportunistic electoral effects in French municipalities as is also the case with Drazen 
and Eslava (2010) who consider Colombian municipalities and reveal electoral effects 
on the most visible expenditure components. Aidt et al. (2011) document that pre-
electoral fiscal manipulation is larger when an incumbent is facing a tight race.  
 The potential of incumbents to influence various policy domains beyond the 
traditional domain of budgetary decision, motivates a shift in focus from cycles in 
local fiscal policies to political cycles in local public hiring. Indeed, unemployment is 
important for an incumbent’s popularity (e.g., Feld and Kirchgässner, 2000; Lewis-
Beck and Paldam, 2000) and opportunistically motivated politicians seem to 
acknowledge this fact (e.g., Mechtel and Potrafke, 2011). Only very recently have a 
limited number of empirical analyses of political cycles in local government 
employment emerged. Such concerns motivate Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) who 
consider teachers’ appointments in 16 German States documenting the presence of 
politically induced cycles in public employment as the hiring of new teachers 
accelerates during election periods. Their evidence, however, also suggests that the 
increases in hiring are to a large extent compensated through reductions that occur at 
other phases of the electoral cycle.  Coelho et al. (2006) study politically motivated 
employment cycles in Portuguese municipalities. Their evidence shows that elections 
positively affect municipal employment in the cases where the incumbent’s party has 
a majority in the municipal assembly or when the mayor is seeking re-election. In 
addition, they show that increases in local employment occur in those economic 
activities that are most visible by the electorate like construction works and 
community services. Similar results are documented by Dahlberg and Mörk (2011) 
who use data from municipalities in Finland and Sweden, verifying the existence of 
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political cycles in local public employment. They uncover increases in the number of 
employees during election years, which can be attributed to incumbents’ opportunistic 
behavior seeking re-election.  
 As the relevant literature remains somewhat limited a number of questions arise 
with regard to political cycles in municipal employment. Focusing on the Greek case, 
an advanced economy with a long history of intense electoral competition and close 
ties between local and central government, we are able to investigate both the 
presence of opportunistically induced cycles in municipal employment and how the 
political framework and institutional environment affect their magnitude. Importantly, 
the structure of our dataset allows us to focus on how municipal elections affect the 
composition of employment in terms of the form of the employment relationships. 
This is the first study of political cycles in local government that explores the 
composition of employment. This can be an important aspect in the investigation of 
political cycles in public hiring to the extent that different constraints may apply for 
hiring under different employment categories allowing a more refined understanding 
of how opportunistically motivated politicians may exploit these differences.  
 
3. Institutional Environment, Data and Empirical Strategy 
 3.1 Local Government’s Institutions 
Greece’s municipalities constitute an ideal case for analyzing the effect of elections 
on public hiring as, in the absence of strong institutional constraints, incumbents are 
in effect provided with mandates that allow them to pursue opportunistic policies 
without checks and balances (Pelagidis, 2009). Municipal elections in Greece have 
been characterized by strong partisan divisions as the elected mayors in the majority 
of municipalities were supported by the two main parties (the right-wing New 
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Democracy and the left-wing PASOK). Up until 2010, municipal elections in Greece 
were held every four years in October with the winner being determined in a two 
round process. A reform act introduced in 2010 increased mayors’ terms to five years. 
The electorate votes in favor of electoral lists, submitted by candidate mayors who are 
usually backed by political parties. The winning list receives the majority of the 
members in the municipal assembly and the office of the mayor who is the agenda 
setter and key political decision-maker in Greece’s local politics. The municipalities 
follow uniform rules in their decision-making and have full control over the allocation 
of their resources. The key source of municipalities' financing is the central 
government’s budget.  
 
3.2 Data 
To study for possible electoral effects on public hiring at the municipal level we 
construct a dataset consisting of 109 Greek municipalities that correspond to half of 
Greece’s population as per the 2001 Census. To ensure institutional homogeneity and 
continuity in our dataset we focus only on those municipalities that were not affected 
by the municipal mergers introduced in the major administrative reform of 1997. The 
1997 reform drastically reduced the total number of municipalities and increased their 
size in order to enhance administrative efficiency.  
 The time dimension of our panel is constrained by data availability. In 
particular, employment data are available from 1996 to 2009 and thus, the time span 
of our panel covers the municipal elections, held in 1998, 2002 and 2006. We retrieve 
data on Greece’s municipal employment from the relevant publications provided by 
the Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSA). Data on employment are an integral part of 
the “Municipalities and Communes Income–Expenditure” annual reports since 1996. 
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These reports are publicly accessible from the Digital Library of the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority. The data, however, are available only in Greek and not in a time 
series format.  
Municipal employment data provide information on the number of Total 
Employees and are disaggregated into three subcomponents that capture the 
employment relationship between municipalities and the employees, namely  
Permanent, Contract and Day Labor Employees. Among these three subcomponents, 
Permanent Employees constitute the larger part of Total Employees, followed by 
Contract Employees, while Day Labor Employees correspond to the smallest 
fragment of the total number of municipal employees.   
Figure 1 presents the year average employment level of Total Employees and each 
one of its three subcomponents for the 109 municipalities included in our dataset, 
during the time span of our investigation. In Figure 2 we mean-center the averaged 
variables presented above and explicitly focus on Permanent and Contract Employees 
that correspond to the largest part of municipal employment. In Figure 2 a distinct 
cyclical pattern can be observed for the case of Contract Employees. This cyclical 
pattern is present during both general and municipal elections.  
 
Figure 1 Average Employment.109 Municipalities: 1996-2009 
 9 
 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority. 
 
 
Figure 2 Average Employment (mean-centered): 1996-2009 
 
The data cover 109 Municipalities during 1996-2009. 
Solid vertical lines correspond to municipal election 
years and dashed lines to general election years.  
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority. 
 
 
3.3 Empirical model and estimation strategy 
To test for the presence of politically induced cycles in municipal elections we 
estimate a typical political business cycles model of the following form:                                                    
�௝௜� = ߚଵ�௝௜�−ଵ + ߚଶ�௝௜�−ଶ + ߛ����ݐ�݋݊ݏ௜� + ߜ�௜� + η௜ + ߝ� + ݑ௜�                           (1)                 
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where y୨୧t corresponds to each one the j employment variables used as dependent 
variable in municipality i and year t. The lagged dependent variable y୨୧t−z, with z =1, 
2, captures the persistence of the dependent variable (various employment categories). ����ݐ�݋݊ݏ௜� is a dummy variable that captures the electoral effect and the vector itX  
contains a number of control variables. We denote the unobserved municipal-specific 
effects and the time-specific effects �௜ and ߝ� respectively, while  ݑ௜� is an 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term. The employment variables 
used in our analysis include the change in the total number of municipal employees 
(ǻTotal Employees) and its subcategories, permanent, contract and day labor 
employees (ǻPermanent, ǻContract and ǻDay Labor employees) that capture the 
different employment relationships. All employment variables are expressed as per 
1000 residents. 
We use a wide set of control variables to account for the economic, institutional, 
and political environment. The 2005 change in financial reporting standards renders 
the use of fiscal data at the municipal level non feasible. Thus we use the change in 
cyclical regional employment (ǻRegEmployment) as a proxy for the macroeconomic 
conditions in the country’s regions. To control for the effect of municipal population 
size we follow Veiga and Veiga (2007) and construct a Population Category variable, 
by assigning the value 1 to the two largest cities, and the values of 2, 3, and 4 to cities 
with population over 40,000, 10,000-40,000, and less than 10,000 respectively. In 
addition to this categorical variable we consider directly the log population for 
robustness purposes. To capture the effects of the population’s age structure in each 
municipality we consider the percentage of population below 15 years old and above 
65 years old (%Pop <15, % Pop>65).  We also use dummy variables to account for 
the possible presence of partisan/ideology effects. These variables (left/right) take the 
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value of one when the incumbent is elected with the support of a left or right wing 
political party respectively and zero otherwise. We include a linear time trend to 
control for the effects of the booming economy during the period under consideration. 
To test if the emergence of political cycles is conditioned upon factors that affect 
an incumbent's motive for electioneering we allow elections to interact with dummy 
variables to capture electoral effects when the mayor is politically aligned with the 
ruling party or not (Elections*PolAlignment, Elections*NotPolAlignment), with 
dummies to control for mayors who may run for another term or 
not (Elections*Recandidate and Elections*NotRecandidate ), and finally with 
dummies that capture the intensiveness of electoral competition. In particular, we 
account for the presence of swing voters, using the number of partisan shifts that 
occurred in each municipality in our sample during the three elections under 
consideration to develop a variable that distinguishes between Swing and non-Swing 
municipalities. In addition, we test how the turnover rate of mayors might affect the 
presence and size of electoral effects. We consider the number of different individuals 
having served as mayors since 1982 to distinguish between municipalities with low, 
medium, and high levels of mayor turnover rate. Finally, we investigate how general 
elections,the year before and the year after elections affect local employment using 
dummy variables that take the value of one in the corresponding years and zero 
otherwise.3   
As equation (1) is a standard dynamic panel data specification, the presence of the 
lagged dependent variables and municipality specific effects renders the OLS 
estimator biased and inconsistent. Although the Fixed-Effects (FE) estimator 
eliminates the unit specific effects, it cannot eliminate the bias introduced by the 
                                                          
3
 Sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss in more detail the interaction terms used in our analysis. 
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inclusion of the lagged dependent variables among the regressors. The order of the FE 
estimator bias is 1/T, where T corresponds to the time length of the panel (see Nickell, 
1981; Kiviet, 1995). Given that the time length of our panel is relatively short, the use 
of the FE estimator in the context of a dynamic model may give rise to a non-
negligible bias. To address this possibility we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
two-step system GMM estimator for dynamic panel data (see also, Shi and Svensson 
2006; Veiga and Veiga 2007).4 We treat all institutional and political variable (i.e. 
elections, political alignment, re-candidate, swing, left right etc.) and all variables 
that capture the population structure (%Pop<15 and %Pop>65) as exogenous. In 
contrast we treat the level of regional employment as endogenous. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 1 reports our baseline estimations, which provide strong evidence of a 
politically induced cycle in Greece’s local employment. Results in Column (1) show 
that elections have a positive and significant effect on the number of municipal Total 
Employees as the coefficient on the Elections variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results presented in Columns (2) to (4) suggest that 
this result is driven by election-year increases in the number of Contract Employees 
as the respective coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The estimates suggest that the annual change in the rate of municipal employees 
(Total Employees per 1,000 residents) increases by 1.281 in election years. The 
annual change in the rate of municipal employees on a contract basis (Contract 
Employees per 1,000 residents) also increases by 0.787. Such electoral effects, 
                                                          
4
 See notes in Table 1. 
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however, are not present for the population employed as "Permanent" and "By Day 
Employees". The absence of similar electoral effects on Permanent Employees 
indicates that political cycles in local employment emerge in the area where rules for 
hiring tend to be more flexible, subject to less public scrutiny, and possibly where an 
implicit promise of contract renewal conditional on the successful electoral outcome 
for the incumbent can be made. This finding is consistent with the view that 
incumbents who engage in electioneering prefer policy instruments that are easier to 
manipulate (Franzese and Jusko, 2006). We perform a number of diagnostic tests. In 
particular, the Hansen test validates the set of instruments used, the AR(1) test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation while the AR(2) fails to reject the null 
hypothesis at conventional significance levels 
With regard to the control variables, the results show that small-sized 
municipalities, whose operation tends to be less visible and under less public scrutiny 
when compared to large sized municipal entities, are associated with larger numbers 
of Permanent Employees. "Aged" municipalities, with a higher percentage of 
population over 65 years old, also have a greater number of Permanent Employees. 
On the other hand, partisan effects are generally absent, as almost all of the estimated 
coefficients on the partisanship/ideology variables Left and Right are not statistically 
significant with the exception of Day Labor Employees that is negatively associated 
with left-wing mayors. This results can be interpreted in terms of left-wing mayors' 
ideological aversion toward less secure (“exploitative”) employment contracts.  
 
4.2 Conditional Effects 
The magnitude of the electoral effect may depend on various factors that affect an 
incumbent’s incentive or ability to adopt opportunistic policies prior to elections so 
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we test for these. First we investigate how a mayors’ decision to run for another term 
affects the magnitude of the political cycle. To test for possible differences in the 
magnitude of the electoral effect when a mayor is running for re-election or not we 
allow Elections to interact with Recandidate and NotRecandidate dummy variables. 
The former dummy takes the value of one when the mayor is a repeat candidate and 
zero otherwise while the latter is constructed similarly taking the value of one when 
the incumbent is not a repeat candidate and zero otherwise. We augment our baseline 
model with the two interaction terms ELE*Recandidate and ELE*NotRecandidate 
that capture elections where the mayor is a repeat candidate and not respectively. 
Results presented in Table 2, Columns (1) to (4) show that a political cycle is present 
both when the mayor is running for another term and when she is not. In line with our 
baseline findings, evidence suggests that political cycles are driven by increases in 
Contract Employees. To identify differences in the magnitude of the cycles between 
these two cases we test the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on 
ELE*Recandidate and ELE*NotRecandidate for the case of Contract Employees are 
equal.  A Wald test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact 
of elections when the incumbent is a repeat candidate is equal to that when she is not. 
The same holds true when we test the same hypothesis for the coefficients obtained 
when Total Employees are the dependent variable. Our results contrast with the 
evidence Veiga and Veiga (2007) provide for municipalities in Portugal where 
electoral effects in municipal employment are present only when the incumbent runs 
for another term. One can interpret this difference as a result of political parties’ 
strong presence in Greece’s local politics, which ensures a form of continuity even 
when the incumbent is not seeking re-election. The results for the remaining variables 
entering the specification remain qualitatively the same as in Table 1.  
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Since local politics in Greece are tightly associated with national politics, we 
specifically study how a mayor’s political alignment with the governing party5 may 
affect the magnitude of the electoral effects on municipal employment. As before we 
allow Elections to interact with PolAlignment and NotPolAlignment. The former 
dummy equals one if a mayor was elected with the ruling party's support and zero 
otherwise. The latter dummy takes the value of one if a mayor was not elected with 
the ruling party's support and zero otherwise. The ELE* PolAlignment term captures 
elections where the mayor is aligned to central government and the ELE* 
NotPolAlignment term captures elections where the mayor is not aligned to central 
government. Although one would expect larger electoral effects when the incumbent 
shares the same party affiliation with the government as he enjoys increased ability 
for pre-electoral manipulation results presented in Columns (5) to (8) in Table 2 
suggest that this is not the case. Political cycles in local employment are present and 
of similar size both when the incumbent is aligned with central government and when 
he is not.6 As before, the rest of the estimated coefficients remain qualitatively the 
same. 
Another factor that might affect the size of the electoral effect is the presence of 
swing voters as incumbents may have greater incentives to pursue opportunistic 
policies before elections in municipalities where a clear partisan majority is absent. 
To test how this may affect the size of political cycle we distinguish between “swing” 
and “non-swing” municipalities. Similarly to Drazen and Eslava (2010) we 
characterize municipalities as such according to the number of partisan shifts that 
                                                          
5
 For the whole time dimension of our panel Greece was ruled by single party governments. 
6
 A Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on ELE*PolAlignment and 
ELE*NotPolAlignment are equal. This result is similar for the coefficients obtained when Total 
Employees and Permanent Employees are used as the dependent variables. When we include the 
variable PolAlignment as a separate control in the model the estimated coefficient is not significant 
while all other coefficients remain the same as in Columns (5) to (8).  
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occurred in the three elections included in our sample. We classify a municipality as 
“swing” if it has experienced two partisan shifts7 in the elections included in our 
sample and as “non-swing” if it has experience one or zero partisan shifts. We create 
two dummy variables that correspond to each one of these categories with Swing 
taking the value of one for those municipalities characterized as “swing” and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, NonSwing takes the value of one for those municipalities 
characterized as “non-swing” and zero otherwise. Again we allow Ǽlections to 
interact with these two dummies to capture the relevant effects. One would expect 
electoral effects to be more pronounced in swing municipalities as electoral 
competition is more intense and mayorships switch more often. Results presented in 
Table 3, Columns (1) to (4) suggest that electoral effects are present both in swing and 
non-swing municipalities and they are of the same magnitude.8 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests  
As a further robustness check to electoral competition effects, in addition to 
partisan shifts, we consider the number of individuals having served as mayors for 
each municipality. A high turnover rate of mayors may indicate high levels of 
political competition while a low turnover rate may indicate that local politics are 
dominated by few individuals. We use the number of different individuals having 
served as mayors since 1982 to categorize each municipality in our sample according 
to mayors turnover rate. Municipalities within one standard deviation from the sample 
mean, for the number of different mayors, fall into the Medium Turnover category 
while the rest are categorized either as Low or High Turnover municipalities, 
                                                          
7
 The variable Swing corresponds to partisan shifts and not in mayor changes as a right wing mayor can 
be succeeded by another one with the same affiliation in the case where the former mayor in no longer 
a candidate.    
8
 A Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal.   
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respectively. We construct three dummy variables that denote a Low, Medium, or 
High Turnover municipality and we allow Elections to interact with these three 
dummies. The results presented in Table 4, columns (5) to (8), show that political 
cycles emerge irrespectively of the level of mayor's turnover as when we distinguish 
between ‘swing’ and ‘non-swing’ municipalities. Once again, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the electoral effect is the same in Low and Medium turnover 
municipalities. Likewise, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the electoral effect is 
the same in High and Medium turnover municipalities.  
To consider whether public hiring increases emerge only during election years we 
include a dummy that captures the year before elections as some policies may take 
time to be implemented. As the results in Table 4, Columns (1) to (4), show the Year 
Before Elections variable has a positive effect on municipal employment following a 
similar pattern with the Elections variable. A Wald test, however, suggests that the 
size of this effect is smaller than that the effect of Elections on public hiring. The 
results show that the impact of elections on the annual change in the rate of municipal 
employees (Total Employees per 1,000 residents) is more than twice that of the year 
before elections as the estimated coefficients suggest an increase in the dependent 
variable of  0.552 in the year before elections compared to 1.281 in the election year. 
As local politics in Greece are closely associated to national politics, and political 
parties have a strong presence at the level of local governments, we test how general 
elections affect municipal employment. The results in Columns (5) to (8) suggest that 
General Elections also have a positive effect on municipal employment, corroborating 
a visible pattern revealed by casual inspection of Figure 2.  
In addition to testing whether the year before elections affects our dependent 
variables, we introduce an additional dummy to capture possible post electoral effects. 
 18 
This “Year after Elections” dummy takes the value of one in the year after elections 
and zero otherwise. The finding presented in Table 5 Columns 1-4, suggest that 
positive post-electoral effects are present and statistically significant. These effects 
pertain to the same employment categories as the ones presented in the baseline 
specification. Yet, as a Wald test suggests, the effect of the “Year after Elections”on 
Total Employment is of smaller magnitude as compared to the effect during the 
election year. In particular, our results show that in the year after elections the annual 
change in the rate of municipal employees (Total Employees per 1,000 residents)  and 
municipal employees on a contract basis (Contract Employees per 1,000 residents)  
increases by 0.831 and 0.696 respectively. Thus, our evidence suggests an eroding 
process, as after elections the hiring process is not reversed but continues, albeit at a 
slower pace. 
We further test the robustness of our results by using log employment as the 
dependent variable instead of ǻEmployment. The results are consistent with those of 
the baseline specification as Columns 5-8 in Table 5 show, except when the log of 
“By Day Employees” is used as the dependent variable, where the AR(1) test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis 
 When we replace our categorical population variable (PopCat) variable with the 
log of the population (variable "log Total Population") the results are consistent with 
those that emerge from the baseline specification. In particular, when we use the log 
of population variable the results show that an increasing population negatively 
affects employment which corroborates the baseline finding that a smaller population, 
as captured by the categorical population variable (Popcat) has a positive effect on 
employment. 
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 Finally, we test the robustness of our results by excluding the small sized 
municipalities, specifically municipalities with less than 10,000 citizens (Population 
Category 4). The results remain qualitatively the same.   
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
We consider the presence of political cycles in Greek municipal employment 
across various categories of employment (permanent, temporary/contract and day-
labor employees), contributing to a rather small literature on the opportunistically 
induced cycles in public hiring at the municipal government level. Our results provide 
support to the opportunistic cycle hypothesis, as elections positively affect the number 
of municipal employees. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that while the electoral 
effect is manifested by increases in the number of the Total Employees, it is mainly 
driven by increases of Contract Employees. That is, political cycles in local 
employment affect the composition of employment in terms of the form of the 
employment relationships. A similar opportunistic cycle in municipal employment 
emerges with respect to the general elections, a finding that is indicative of the close 
ties between central and local government politics in Greece. The above findings 
emerge regardless of whether the mayors run for reelection and regardless of whether 
incumbents are politically aligned with the central government. Also intense electoral 
competition does not affect the size of the opportunistic effects that are present in 
municipalities that swing often. Our findings provide explicit evidence of incumbents' 
opportunistic behavior in Greece’s municipalities manifested mainly through the 
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hiring of contract employees. This characterization of the nexus between politicians 
and voters, as well as the subsequent clientelistic practices, can be considered as 
important contributing factor to Greece’s fiscal derailment and overall current 
economic predicament. Further research in this area could possibly explore 
employment in the local development corporations, and the distribution of 
employment across industries/firms.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Political Cycles in Local Employment. Baseline Findings. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
     
Linear Time Trend 0.0175 -0.000720 -0.00414 0.0222 
 (0.0686) (0.0449) (0.0421) (0.0332) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0875 0.0489 -0.133 0.0235 
 (0.138) (0.0722) (0.115) (0.0779) 
Elections 1.281*** 0.213 0.787** 0.113 
 (0.331) (0.373) (0.333) (0.243) 
Left -0.129 0.0287 -0.0193 -0.145* 
 (0.134) (0.0556) (0.109) (0.0823) 
Right -0.0470 -0.0455 -0.0739 0.0343 
 (0.164) (0.0660) (0.112) (0.103) 
Population Category 0.172** 0.0921** -0.0108 0.0189 
 (0.0862) (0.0389) (0.0507) (0.0309) 
% Pop<15 -8.355* -4.250 -3.486 -1.243 
 (4.669) (3.091) (2.947) (2.104) 
% Pop>65% 1.307 2.514* 1.243 -0.584 
 (3.086) (1.453) (1.428) (1.574) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.313*** -0.236** -0.406*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0968) (0.101) (0.0864) (0.0486) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.259*** -0.0865* -0.119* -0.116*** 
 (0.0955) (0.0519) (0.0610) (0.0380) 
     
AR(1)a 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.029 
AR(2)a 0.326 0.498 0.962 0.677 
Hansen Testb 0.147 0.147 0.618 0.656 
No of Instruments 30 30 30 30 
Observations 869 869 869 869 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with finite-sample correction for the two step covariance 
matrix as    developed by Windmeijer (2005), ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. 
Time fixed effects are generally insignificant and are not reported to economize on space.  
a Arellano-Bond test for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
H0: No serial correlation.  
bHansen test for over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis corresponds to valid over-identifying 
restrictions. 
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Table 2: Political Cycles in Local Employment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
         
Linear Time Trend 0.0164 -0.00665 -0.00196 0.0231 0.0153 4.57e-05 -0.00412 0.0226 
 (0.0690) (0.0449) (0.0419) (0.0332) (0.0703) (0.0450) (0.0425) (0.0330) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0897 0.0401 -0.131 0.0210 -0.0828 0.0477 -0.134 0.0235 
 (0.137) (0.0770) (0.114) (0.0795) (0.136) (0.0720) (0.112) (0.0765) 
Elections*ReCandidate 1.265*** 0.183 0.815** 0.108     
 (0.350) (0.374) (0.336) (0.246)     
Elections*NotReCandidate 1.361*** 0.360 0.636* 0.189     
 (0.348) (0.381) (0.343) (0.274)     
Elections*PolAlignment     1.212*** 0.180 0.899** 0.0894 
     (0.346) (0.340) (0.351) (0.258) 
Elections*NotPolAlignment     1.350*** 0.254 0.749** 0.131 
     (0.343) (0.354) (0.318) (0.240) 
PolAlignment     0.0740 0.0103 0.0483 -0.00822 
     (0.111) (0.0570) (0.0818) (0.0793) 
Left -0.129 0.0349 -0.0200 -0.149* -0.162 0.0302 -0.0671 -0.138 
 (0.134) (0.0563) (0.109) (0.0826) (0.159) (0.0557) (0.131) (0.106) 
Right -0.0434 -0.0374 -0.0770 0.0313 -0.0875 -0.0407 -0.118 0.0394 
 (0.165) (0.0671) (0.112) (0.104) (0.197) (0.0795) (0.130) (0.127) 
Population Category 0.174** 0.0961** -0.0138 0.0206 0.166* 0.0910** -0.00998 0.0187 
 (0.0878) (0.0390) (0.0519) (0.0310) (0.0868) (0.0384) (0.0493) (0.0304) 
% Pop<15 -8.343* -3.992 -3.496 -1.311 -8.294* -4.264 -3.529 -1.254 
 (4.719) (3.034) (2.987) (2.127) (4.785) (3.106) (2.929) (2.106) 
% Pop>65% 1.336 2.631* 1.147 -0.646 1.270 2.379 1.308 -0.622 
 (3.042) (1.461) (1.430) (1.578) (3.267) (1.552) (1.402) (1.573) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.314*** -0.241** -0.404*** -0.398*** -0.304*** -0.234** -0.405*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0985) (0.0984) (0.0866) (0.0488) (0.0972) (0.101) (0.0861) (0.0485) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.259*** -0.0846 -0.120** -0.116*** -0.261*** -0.0849* -0.119* -0.117*** 
 (0.0950) (0.0518) (0.0609) (0.0376) (0.0953) (0.0510) (0.0612) (0.0388) 
         
AR(1) 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.029 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.024 
AR(2) 0.330 0.525 0.942 0.664 0.085 0.500 0.230 0.202 
Hansen Test 0.149 0.159 0.581 0.668 0.174 0.163 0.566 0.324 
Sign. Test (p-values) (Ho: Equality of 
estimated coefficients for interaction terms) 
0.725 0.054 0.233 0.495 0.505 0.407 0.316 0.748 
No of Instruments 31 31 31 31 32 32 32 32 
Observations 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
 Notes: See Table 1
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Table 3: Political Cycles in Local Employment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
Linear Time Trend 0.0336 -0.00170 0.00815 0.0240 0.0260 -0.000883 -0.00395 0.0214 
 (0.0703) (0.0455) (0.0420) (0.0336) (0.0658) (0.0443) (0.0423) (0.0334) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0927 0.0506 -0.141 0.0239 -0.0879 0.0519 -0.132 0.0235 
 (0.138) (0.0690) (0.117) (0.0767) (0.139) (0.0734) (0.115) (0.0773) 
Elections*Swing 1.175*** 0.113 0.889** 0.172     
 (0.389) (0.381) (0.379) (0.250)     
Elections*NotSwing 1.368*** 0.274 0.797** 0.0824     
 (0.334) (0.381) (0.330) (0.246)     
Swing 0.192 0.0430 0.0930 -0.00367     
 (0.124) (0.0555) (0.0635) (0.0489)     
Elections*LowTurnover     1.355*** 0.234 0.973** 0.113 
     (0.408) (0.388) (0.434) (0.265) 
Elections*MediumTurnover     1.323*** 0.195 0.769** 0.132 
     (0.343) (0.374) (0.340) (0.256) 
Elections*HighTurnover     1.111*** 0.256 0.682* 0.0959 
     (0.393) (0.372) (0.381) (0.227) 
Left -0.115 0.0287 -0.00450 -0.140* -0.131 0.0295 -0.0302 -0.151* 
 (0.134) (0.0551) (0.107) (0.0819) (0.132) (0.0554) (0.110) (0.0823) 
Right -0.0594 -0.0434 -0.0771 0.0382 -0.0508 -0.0456 -0.0772 0.0310 
 (0.165) (0.0666) (0.112) (0.103) (0.166) (0.0659) (0.113) (0.103) 
Population Category 0.179** 0.0923** -0.00898 0.0198 0.173** 0.0935** -0.0183 0.0185 
 (0.0852) (0.0387) (0.0481) (0.0310) (0.0828) (0.0392) (0.0526) (0.0305) 
% Pop<15 -9.136* -4.237 -4.022 -1.272 -8.958* -4.239 -3.412 -1.126 
 (4.716) (3.122) (2.865) (2.116) (4.646) (3.054) (3.002) (2.108) 
% Pop>65% 0.341 2.473* 0.421 -0.729 1.198 2.489* 1.281 -0.624 
 (3.063) (1.437) (1.538) (1.606) (2.937) (1.492) (1.424) (1.561) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.316*** -0.242** -0.408*** -0.398*** -0.316*** -0.235** -0.402*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0949) (0.100) (0.0861) (0.0483) (0.0913) (0.101) (0.0848) (0.0483) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.260*** -0.0847 -0.118* -0.117*** -0.259*** -0.0875* -0.117* -0.115*** 
 (0.0954) (0.0517) (0.0607) (0.0382) (0.0941) (0.0507) (0.0620) (0.0385) 
AR(1) 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.028 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.027 
AR(2) 0.344 0.540 0.974 0.685 0.328 0.478 0.996 0.664 
Hansen Test 0.149 0.131 0.649 0.672 0.154 0.154 0.543 0.663 
Sign Test (p-value) (Ho: Equality of  
interaction terms estimated coefficients) 
0.401 0.072 0.509 0.365     
Sign Test (p-value) (Ho: Low Turnover 
effect=Medium Turnover effect) 
    0.886 0.715 0.413 0.869 
Sign Test (p-value) (Ho: Medium 
Turnover effect=High Turnover effect) 
    0.507 0.357 0.618 0.725 
No of Instruments 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Observations 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Notes: See Table 1
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Table 4: Political Cycles in Local Employment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
         
Linear Time Trend 0.0175 -0.000720 -0.00414 0.0222 -0.398*** -0.0314 -0.352*** 0.0237 
 (0.0686) (0.0449) (0.0421) (0.0332) (0.129) (0.212) (0.126) (0.0759) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0875 0.0489 -0.133 0.0235 -0.0875 0.0489 -0.133 0.0235 
 (0.138) (0.0722) (0.115) (0.0779) (0.138) (0.0722) (0.115) (0.0779) 
YearBeforeElections 0.552* 0.0843 0.461* 0.0230     
 (0.327) (0.346) (0.277) (0.228)     
Elections 1.281*** 0.213 0.787** 0.113 5.853*** 0.550 4.614*** 0.0944 
 (0.331) (0.373) (0.333) (0.243) (1.731) (2.464) (1.681) (1.132) 
General Elections     5.818*** 0.429 4.870*** -0.0233 
     (1.847) (2.667) (1.742) (1.156) 
Left -0.129 0.0287 -0.0193 -0.145* -0.129 0.0287 -0.0193 -0.145* 
 (0.134) (0.0556) (0.109) (0.0823) (0.134) (0.0556) (0.109) (0.0823) 
Right -0.0470 -0.0455 -0.0739 0.0343 -0.0470 -0.0455 -0.0739 0.0342 
 (0.164) (0.0660) (0.112) (0.103) (0.164) (0.0660) (0.112) (0.103) 
Population Category 0.172** 0.0921** -0.0108 0.0189 0.172** 0.0921** -0.0108 0.0189 
 (0.0862) (0.0389) (0.0507) (0.0309) (0.0862) (0.0389) (0.0507) (0.0309) 
% Pop<15 -8.355* -4.250 -3.486 -1.243 -8.355* -4.250 -3.486 -1.234 
 (4.669) (3.091) (2.947) (2.104) (4.669) (3.091) (2.947) (2.104) 
% Pop>65% 1.307 2.514* 1.243 -0.584 1.307 2.514* 1.243 -0.578 
 (3.086) (1.453) (1.428) (1.574) (3.086) (1.453) (1.428) (1.574) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.313*** -0.236** -0.406*** -0.397*** -0.313*** -0.236** -0.406*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0968) (0.101) (0.0864) (0.0486) (0.0968) (0.101) (0.0864) (0.0486) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.259*** -0.0865* -0.119* -0.116*** -0.259*** -0.0865* -0.119* -0.116*** 
 (0.0955) (0.0519) (0.0610) (0.0380) (0.0955) (0.0519) (0.0610) (0.0380) 
         
AR(1) 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.005 0.006 0.012 0.029 
AR(2) 0.081 0.498 0.238 0.198 0.326 0.498 0.962 0.677 
Hansen Test 0.166 0.147 0.563 0.328 0.147 0.147 0.618 0.656 
Sign. Test (p-values) (Ho: 
YearBeforeElections=Elections) 
0.000 0.104 0.023 0.341     
Sign. Test (p-values) (Ho: 
Elections=General Elections) 
    0.782 0.570 0.072 0.295 
No of Instruments 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 869 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
 Notes: See Table 1 
 
 28 
Table 5: Political Cycles in Local Employment. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
LogTotal  
Employees 
LogPermanent 
Employees 
LogContract 
Employees 
LogDay Labor 
Employees 
         
Linear Time Trend 0.0175 0.0104 -0.00414 0.0211 0.601*** 0.0681 1.131** 1.061 
 (0.0686) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0330) (0.195) (0.131) (0.450) (0.719) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0875 0.0526 -0.133 0.0235     
 (0.138) (0.0728) (0.115) (0.0777)     
LogRegEmployment     -0.0350 -0.0102 -0.233** -0.167 
     (0.0232) (0.0237) (0.110) (0.128) 
Elections 1.281*** 0.108 0.787** 0.110 1.875*** 0.272 3.119** 1.021 
 (0.331) (0.441) (0.333) (0.245) (0.558) (0.391) (1.252) (0.842) 
Year After Elections 0.831*** -0.0579 0.696*** -0.00498     
 (0.264) (0.452) (0.249) (0.165)     
Left -0.129 0.0289 -0.0193 -0.145* 0.000592 -0.00391 -0.0451 -0.187 
 (0.134) (0.0558) (0.109) (0.0823) (0.0499) (0.0140) (0.0685) (0.235) 
Right -0.0470 -0.0460 -0.0739 0.0337 0.0755 -0.0152 0.0104 0.301 
 (0.164) (0.0662) (0.112) (0.103) (0.0593) (0.0172) (0.0793) (0.305) 
Population Category 0.172** 0.0922** -0.0108 0.0191 -0.696** -0.0472 -0.452*** -0.604*** 
 (0.0862) (0.0391) (0.0507) (0.0309) (0.312) (0.0967) (0.0943) (0.206) 
% Pop<15 -8.355* -4.380 -3.486 -1.179 -1.405 -0.0908 3.177 12.00 
 (4.669) (3.197) (2.947) (2.107) (3.187) (0.640) (5.160) (7.845) 
% Pop>65% 1.307 2.511 1.243 -0.544 -6.369* 0.0715 4.111 -5.110 
 (3.086) (1.565) (1.428) (1.576) (3.498) (0.686) (5.889) (5.580) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.313*** -0.234** -0.406*** -0.397*** 0.290 0.755*** 0.415*** 0.526*** 
 (0.0968) (0.102) (0.0864) (0.0486) (0.207) (0.0795) (0.0568) (0.141) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.259*** -0.0888* -0.119* -0.116*** 0.0922 0.198*** 0.163*** -0.131 
 (0.0955) (0.0519) (0.0610) (0.0380) (0.0719) (0.0499) (0.0501) (0.0843) 
         
AR(1) 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.090 
AR(2) 0.081 0.474 0.238 0.198 0.896 0.904 0.174 0.374 
Hansen Test 0.166 0.130 0.563 0.328 0.958 0.235 0.772 0.229 
Sign. Test (p-values) (Ho: 
YearAfterElections=Elections) 
0.020 0.012 0.514 0.347     
Sign. Test (p-values) (Ho: 
Elections=General Elections) 
        
No of Instruments 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Observations 869 869 869 869 971 971 971 971 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
 Notes: See Table 1 
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Table 6: Political Cycles in Local Employment. LogTotalPop 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ΔTotal  
Employees 
ΔPermanent 
Employees 
ΔContract 
Employees 
ΔDay Labor 
Employees 
     
Linear Time Trend 0.152* 0.0619 -0.0230 0.0357 
 (0.0858) (0.0558) (0.0592) (0.0368) 
ΔRegEmployment -0.0894 0.0479 -0.134 0.0237 
 (0.139) (0.0728) (0.116) (0.0785) 
Elections 1.659*** 0.412 0.734** 0.153 
 (0.366) (0.407) (0.357) (0.239) 
Left -0.124 0.0285 -0.0223 -0.145* 
 (0.135) (0.0568) (0.106) (0.0853) 
Right -0.0465 -0.0437 -0.0774 0.0347 
 (0.163) (0.0677) (0.111) (0.108) 
LogTotalPopulation -0.124* -0.0587* 0.0150 -0.0118 
 (0.0663) (0.0306) (0.0362) (0.0237) 
% Pop<15 -8.968* -4.375 -3.082 -1.299 
 (4.845) (3.160) (3.097) (2.095) 
% Pop>65% 1.126 2.412 1.372 -0.637 
 (3.095) (1.568) (1.432) (1.493) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-1 -0.315*** -0.238** -0.406*** -0.397*** 
 (0.0965) (0.104) (0.0867) (0.0486) 
(Lagged Dependent  Variable)t-2 -0.261*** -0.0848 -0.119* -0.116*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0521) (0.0613) (0.0381) 
     
AR(1)a 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.028 
AR(2)a 0.326 0.528 0.962 0.677 
Hansen Testb 0.147 0.141 0.617 0.654 
No of Instruments 30 30 30 30 
Observations 869 869 869 869 
No of Municipalities 109 109 109 109 
Notes: See Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
